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Liminality and the Diplomacy of the British Overseas Territories: An Assemblage 
Approach 
 
Abstract  
This paper examines diplomatic processes that compose our geopolitical world as 
dynamic and yet also seemingly affirm the status quo. It turns attention to the 
entrepreneurial creativity of individual diplomats, the transformations occurring at 
threshold moments, spaces and practices, and the materiality of diplomacy that exceeds 
human agency. The paper does so by forging an innovative dialogue between 
assemblage theory and the notion of liminality as developed in cultural anthropology, 
and by focusing on a hitherto overlooked set of diplomatic actors: British Overseas 
Territories (OTs). Three vignettes of OT diplomacy are traced: an account of the liminal 
subjectivity of London-based OT representatives; the 1982 Argentinian invasion that 
tipped the Falkland Islands into a state of greater autonomy; and the geophysical 
‘tipping point’ of the 1997 volcanic eruption on Montserrat that made the island 
dependent for the foreseeable future. The paper concludes by noting potential avenues 
of future research that the synergy between liminality and assemblage may open up in 
the fields of Science and Technology Studies (STS), anthropology and geography. 
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Introduction 
With the rise – and seeming decline – of Islamic State/Daesh, sub-state regions agitating 
for statehood in Europe, China (re)flexing its imperial muscles through the ‘One Belt 
One Road’ initiative and the galvanising of a global movement of indigenous peoples 
reasserting their right to self-determination we are seeing an increasing prominence of 
polities on the cusp of change that have the potential to shift from one state to another, 
without ruling out a shift back again. This paper focuses precisely on the notion of 
tipping points and its relation to polities being multiplicities: of existing in different 
states simultaneously.  
 If polities are multiplicities, then the interactions between polities – their 
diplomacy – is also multiplicitous. There has been increasing recognition by both 
practitioners and scholars that diplomacy, understood here as a combination of 
representation, communication and negotiation by and between polities, is undergoing 
rapid change. These changes include the emergence of new diplomatic actors, the 
transformation of diplomatic practices through new technology (Bjola and Holmes 
2015) and the increasingly blurred professional lines between diplomacy and spheres 
such as the military, humanitarian aid, and environmental science (Hocking et al. 2012). 
There has been a parallel diversification in the theoretical and methodological 
approaches to studying diplomacy, with a growing body of research challenging the 
idea of diplomacy as the special preserve of the state (e.g. Constantinou and Der Derian 
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2010; Dittmer and McConnell 2016). Scholars in critical international relations (IR) and 
geography have drawn on poststructuralist perspectives to explore the role of discourse 
in diplomacy (Der Derian 1987; Constantinou 1996), have been inspired by the 
‘practice turn’ to examine the everyday habits and mundane performances of diplomats 
themselves (Neumann 2002; Kuus 2014; Jones and Clark 2015), and have interrogated 
the relationship between ‘old’ and ‘new’ diplomacy (Sending et al 2011). These 
approaches have resonances with shifts in state theory that attend to how states are 
themselves effects produced through discourse and performance (Weber 1998; Jeffrey 
2013; McConnell 2016) and posit that diplomacy is productive of geopolitical space.  
Drawing on different theoretical emphases, but arriving at a similar place, 
Dittmer (2015; 2016) adopts a Deleuzean approach to diplomacy, emphasising the 
affective potentials within diplomatic encounters. In conceptualizing states as 
assemblages, diplomatic encounters become understandable as second order 
assemblages bringing state bodies, materials, and objects into relation with one another 
in ways that establish new affective vectors and open up new potentials. States engage 
in diplomatic relations to extend their own power in space, but in doing so they open 
themselves up to diplomacy’s constitutive power, which actively reworks the state 
assemblage. Therefore states should not be conceptualized as stable entities engaging in 
diplomatic practices, rather states and the larger assemblages that they form with one 
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another must be understood as in a state of becoming-together, with new potentials for 
political change inherent to this dynamism.  
In this paper we seek to push this innovative understanding of diplomacy as 
dynamic and contingent further by turning attention to the entrepreneurial creativity of 
individual diplomats, the transformations occurring at threshold moments, spaces and 
practice, and the materiality of diplomacy which exceeds human agency. We do so by 
both forging a dialogue between assemblage theory and the notion of liminality as 
developed in cultural anthropology, and by focusing on a hitherto overlooked set of 
diplomatic actors: British Overseas Territories (OTs).  
British OTs are territories under the jurisdiction and sovereignty of the United 
Kingdom but are constitutionally not part of the UK: each territory has a separate 
constitution and a unique legal relationship to the UK. Since 2002, all inhabitants of 
British OTs have full British citizenship1 and the inhabited OTs have Governors that are 
appointed by Queen Elizabeth II and are de facto heads of state.  Formally, OTs have no 
competency for foreign policy; even as more governmental functions have been 
delegated to their locally elected legislatures, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
(FCO) remains the conduit for their diplomatic relations. Nevertheless, in practice these 
polities engage in many forms of diplomacy: with London, with each other, and with 
other polities (e.g. neighbouring states and regional organisations). We hypothesize that 
                                                          
1 The exception is individuals connected solely with the Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus. 
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this seeming paradox can be understood through an examination of OTs' diplomatic 
practices using the conceptual lenses of liminality and assemblage.  
The British OTs, we posit, are an excellent example of liminality, in that they 
perform differently in different times and spaces. This dynamism is not accounted for in 
theories of IR that view states (and OTs) as static categories rather than as multiplicities. 
If liminality points to the spaces and times that are politically fertile, the concept of 
assemblage enables us to study the material conditions in which these time-spaces of 
creativity emerge. The scientific roots of assemblage theory are replete with terms – 
such as tipping points, events and territorialisation – that have thus far not been 
connected with the anthropological literature on liminality despite their significant 
resonances. Our synthesis of these literatures will provide a potent theoretical lens 
through which to examine the British OTs, and will potentially have wider applicability.  
 We first review the conceptual history of liminality before attending to the way 
in which we might theorize liminality through assemblage. We lay this conceptual 
framework alongside a discussion of the dynamic historical relation between the UK 
Government and the British OTs. We then substantiate our conceptual claims by tracing 
three vignettes. These are based on interviews with London-based OT representatives 
that highlighted the liminal position of these individuals within the metropole and 
gestured towards the dynamism, contingency and creativity of OT diplomacy more 
generally. We pursued the latter in relation to specific OTs with analysis of policy 
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documents related to key diplomatic events. We acknowledge that these vignettes lack 
the empirical depth and thick description that would normally be necessary to maximize 
the insights gained into geopolitical assemblages, but our approach allows for snapshots 
of these assemblages over time to be productively juxtaposed, enabling comparative 
insights to form. The first vignette is an account of the recent history of London-based 
representatives of the OTs, whose position and practices broadly substantiates our claim 
that these are liminal actors. We then trace the multiplicity of diplomatic relations that 
have existed between the Falkland Islands and the British Government and between 
Montserrat and the British Government over time. These two relations are notable 
because of the role of events in re-configuring those relations and the OTs themselves. 
For the Falkland Islands, the 1982 Argentinian invasion was an event that tipped the 
Falklands into a state of greater autonomy, while for Montserrat the 1997 volcano 
eruption had the opposite effect, making the island dependent for the foreseeable future. 
These vignettes collectively demonstrate both how liminality is a characteristic of the 
OTs, and how assemblage theory directs our attention to the specific energies and 
materials that enable shifts in polities’ multiplicitous forms. We conclude by noting the 
potential avenues of future research that the synergy between liminality and assemblage 
may open up in the fields of Science and Technology Studies (STS), anthropology and 
geography.  
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Bringing liminality and assemblage into dialogue 
It is well-established that marginal actors, spaces and conditions are productive foci for 
analysis, providing important cases of resistance and radical possibility (Soja 1996; 
Sharp 2013) and offering insights into the power relations that underlie the ‘core’ 
(Navaro Yashin 2003). Despite this, liminality has been largely overlooked in academic 
geography (see McConnell 2017). This is surprising both because of the spatial 
dynamics underpinning liminality, and its revival in other social science fields. 
Contemporary scholars in, inter alia, conflict studies, literature, education, business 
studies and sociology have used liminality to discuss cases as diverse as airports and 
hotels, transgender identities and natural disasters. Indeed Thomassen (2015: 39) goes 
as far as to assert that, given its utility for understanding phenomena in the 
contemporary era characterised by ‘constant change, uncertainty and institutionalized 
contingency,’ liminality ‘should be considered a master concept in the wider social and 
political sciences’. 
Liminality has its roots in the Latin limen, meaning a threshold that needs to be 
crossed. Arnold van Gennep first explored the concept in his seminal Rites of Passage 
(1909). The term gained wider traction when cultural anthropologist Victor Turner 
developed van Gennep’s framework in the 1960s. Paying particular attention to 
individuals who undergo liminal experiences, Turner analysed liminality as a condition 
‘betwixt and between the positions assigned and arrayed by law, custom, convention 
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and ceremonial’ (1969: 95). Turner’s understanding of liminality has been extended 
beyond the cultural sphere and the scale of individuals. Scholars in political science and 
IR have used liminality as a paradigm for understanding societal-level crisis situations, 
structural transformations of institutionalised orders and the constitution of political 
identities (e.g. Norton 1988; Horvath et al 2015). This has included research on 
peripheral states that fit neither the categories of ‘self’ nor ‘other’ in narratives of 
European identity (Rumelili 2003; Yanık 2011), the liminality of post-communist 
transitions (Horvath 2009) and conceptual work disrupting the essentialized binary of 
domestic/international (Mälksoo 2012).  
 There is further potential for the application of liminality across a range of 
problems in international politics, and it is a concept that has productive intersections 
with political geography (McConnell 2017). First, with its roots in experiential 
dimensions of social change, liminality facilitates a more dynamic conceptualisation of 
political subjectivity. By emphasising boundary zones and thresholds, liminality 
disrupts traditional categorisations of geopolitical actors as states or non-states, and 
provides insights into the contingency of belonging and recognition. The resultant 
emphasis on the processual nature of international life, the relationality of power, and 
the dynamic temporality of international politics (Mälksoo 2012) offers a nuanced 
understanding of transformation, emergence and becoming within the international 
system.  This foregrounding of the polyvocality of political subjectivity and the 
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eschewing of hierarchical orders, binary oppositions, and teleological implications also 
has important resonances with recent work that rethinks the nature of political 
legitimacy. As scholars in a recent special issue of Geoforum (Vol 66 November 2015) 
have argued, when the assumption that the state is the sole arbiter and provider of 
legitimacy within a territory is unsettled and legitimacy is de-linked from its traditional 
association with legality and recognition, then this concept emerges as ‘a processual 
technique of governance rather than an achieved status’ (Jeffrey et al 2015: 180). Read 
in this dynamic and plural way, a range of polities – state and non-state, recognised and 
unrecognised – can be seen to claim and contest legitimacy. In turn, having legitimacy 
acknowledged can mark the emergence of a polity from one status, being tipped into 
another. 
Second, just as legitimacy is a productively ambiguous concept (ibid.), so too is 
liminality. As a ‘transition during which the normal limits to thought, self-
understanding and behaviour are relaxed’ (Thomassen 2014: 1) liminality enables 
intense creativity and thereby shines a light on practices of innovation, political renewal 
and imagination. Yet, contra Turner, such creativity does not mean that liminality 
automatically has emancipatory qualities. Rather, liminality is an inherently ambivalent 
condition: ‘the stimulation of creative potentials is inseparable from tragic experiences’ 
(Szakolczai 2015: 34). In sum, there is consensus in the literature that liminality is a 
state in which a person, place, or thing is unsettled, teetering on a threshold with micro-
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scaled dynamics threatening to tip them/it into a different state of being. Beyond this, 
the largely anthropocentric literature on liminality has little to say on the specific 
material conditions that produce these dynamics. We propose, first, that liminality has 
distinct resonances with the notion of assemblage and, second, that assemblage theory 
provides a conceptual toolbox through which specific cases of liminality can be 
analysed.  
Assemblage theory emerged from the work of, inter alia, Deleuze and Guattari 
(2001) and DeLanda (2006), and has parallels with actor-network theory (e.g., Latour 
2005; Callon 1986). It is an approach that, like work on liminality, brings questions of 
emergence and becoming to the fore and encourages an openness to the potentiality of 
change over time, but is distinct in its focus on a more-than-human perspective. 
Assemblages are ‘wholes characterized by relations of exteriority,’ (DeLanda, 2006: 10, 
emphasis in original). Therefore material elements in an assemblage are not limited to 
their roles in that assemblage, as they may simultaneously be in other assemblages 
(Anderson and McFarlane 2011). For instance, a diplomat’s performance does not just 
contribute to the becoming of one assemblage (e.g., a diplomatic encounter), but 
simultaneously contributes to the becoming of another (e.g., the state); both 
assemblages have that diplomat in common. Therefore, affects originating in one 
assemblage can ripple through ‘neighbouring’ assemblages sharing common elements 
(Dittmer 2014). Further, assemblage approaches emphasise the role of non-human 
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elements in the emergence of human subjectivity and agency. For instance, a diplomat’s 
agency is not pre-existing but is emergent from both their bodily capacities and the tools 
and technologies with which that body is in assemblage. Larger apparatuses such as the 
state and the international political system are composed by similar processes (Legg 
2009). This becoming-together of foreign policy elites and their states has profound 
impacts on both the micro-practices of foreign policy formation and on macro-scaled 
international affairs that are only now being explored empirically (Dittmer 2015; 2016). 
Even as they are dynamic at a range of spatial and temporal scales, assemblages 
often appear stable. This is because each assemblage is a multiplicity of forms, only 
one of which is actualized in a given space/time. The others remain virtual, that is they 
are possibilities within the material constraints of the system that are not (yet) 
actualized. DeLanda (2006) visualises this multiplicity of forms in an abstract 
mathematical space, with various possibilities plotted in a multidimensional grid. In 
doing so it becomes possible to chart the tendencies of the assemblage, which are 
mapped as a basin in which most actualizations cluster around one or more ‘attractors’, 
or ideal forms. Outliers are actualizations that resemble the ideal form less and less, 
until they become closer to another attractor in this multidimensional space and tip into 
a different basin of attraction.  For this reason, increasing intensities will seem to have 
little effect on an assemblage until suddenly it reaches a ‘tipping point’ and the elements 
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re-territorialize in a new form, unleashing energies that can ripple through neighbouring 
assemblages sharing common elements.  
The notion of tipping points has resonances with recent work in human geography 
that calls attention to the event as a crucial element of the political. For instance, in 
asking ‘how do we theorize and represent events and the worlds that they transform?’ 
Shaw (2012: 613) directs our attention to the raw non-human forces that act upon our 
human politics, the contingency with which this politics unfolds and, conversely, the 
systemic stability that usually reigns (until it doesn’t). Diplomacy is a field that would 
seemingly be well-positioned to examine ‘the event’, given how it has often been 
understood to hinge on events: summits, state dinners, ‘accidental’ encounters in the 
hallways at the United Nations. 
Drawing from the outline of assemblages above, we conceptualize the event as the 
result of intensive processes that push an assemblage across a tipping point, 
transforming the materials, bodies, and energies found within a given assemblage and 
potentially altering neighbouring assemblages. Events are often imagined as grandiose, 
epochal things, but this ignores the range of spatial scales and temporalities in which 
assemblages unfold. Adopting a Deleuzean approach, Ingram (2017) conceptualises the 
event as potentially less dramatic than ‘the transformation of worlds’; rather, he notes 
that events happen all the time, often beneath our notice or with less-than-world-
transforming consequences. In the remainder of the paper, we use the conceptual 
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language of assemblage theory – events, tipping points, actualization, territorialization– 
to examine how an entity – in this case a British Overseas Territory – might have a 
material configuration that is liminal, i.e., existing at the edge of one configuration and 
therefore on the precipice of rapid transformation. We thereby explore emergent events 
– both obvious and subtle – that have shaped the political forms and diplomatic 
capacities of the British OTs.  
This fusion of assemblage and liminality is productive for several reasons. First, it 
makes clear the multiplicity of every polity (OT or otherwise), thereby demolishing the 
hard-and-fast definitions of ‘the state’ and other categorical framings of political life. It 
instead shows the flexibility of polities, and their ability to actualize various forms 
under different conditions. Second, our synergy of assemblage and liminality provides 
an epistemological and ontological framework through which those different forms and 
conditions can be explicated. As our case studies demonstrate, this framework points to 
different sites within the assemblage as being power-full at crucial moments during 
transitions. Third, the strength of the assemblage approach to liminality is in the way 
that it builds on the relational approaches that have become ascendant within critical 
diplomacy studies while not perpetuating the state-centrism that has dominated the 
wider field. For example, Sending et al. (2011, p.529) have described the treatment of 
proliferating diplomatic actors in the literature as ‘explanation by naming’. Our framing 
of assemblage-liminality pushes beyond this classificatory approach by empirically 
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examining and conceptually reimagining how diplomatic capabilities emerge (or don’t) 
from specific arrangements of materials, bodies and territories. 
 
Shifting relations between the British Government and its Overseas Territories 
Scattered across the world are a series of polities – mostly small islands – which are 
remnants of European empires and which have thus far rejected independence in favour 
of retaining links with their former imperial powers (Aldrich and Connell 1998; Adler-
Nissen and Gad 2013). The UN categorises seventeen of these polities as ‘Non-Self-
Governing Territories’ (NSGTs) and is determined to see through the decolonization 
process (which need not mean independence) through dialogue amongst the 
administering powers, the peoples of the territories, and the Special Committee on 
Decolonization. Ten of the seventeen NSGTs are British OTs: Anguilla, Bermuda, 
British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, Montserrat, Pitcairn 
Islands, Saint Helena, Turks and Caicos Islands. 
The ‘“pandora’s box” of what to do to decolonise relationships with some of the 
last, and longest lasting, remnants of Empire’ (Clegg 2009: 8) has long bedevilled the 
British Government. From the 1970s until the late 1990s the British Government 
assumed that the then-termed ‘Dependent Territories’ would become independent in 
time and it would therefore be able to ‘wash its hands of these “leftovers of Empire”’ 
(Hintjens and Hodge 2012: 198). As a result, relations between Whitehall and the 
 15 
 
Dependent Territories were ad hoc, and little different from the compromises and 
arbitrary settlements that characterised colonial administration (ibid.). However, with 
popular demands for independence in the Territories failing to materialise, the policy 
stance of waiting for an inevitable transfer of sovereignty and thereby completion of 
decolonisation became increasingly untenable.  
It took two significant events in the Territories to shock the FCO governance 
structure into a new form: the devastating volcanic eruption on Montserrat in 1997 
(discussed below) and the corruption scandal that gripped the Turks and Caicos Islands 
(TCI) in 2009. These ‘threshold situations’ – one natural, one man-made – brought into 
stark relief the British Government’s contingent liability vis-à-vis the Territories and 
prompted it to act upon its responsibilities. This shift in the relationship between the 
British Government and the Territories was solidified through two White Papers: 
‘Partnerships for Progress and Prosperity’ issued by the Labour government in 1999 and 
‘Security, Success and Sustainability’ issued by the Coalition government in 2012. 
These Papers document significant political renewal in the relationship between the 
British Government and its Territories, and an acceptance of ‘shared post-colonial 
responsibilities’ based on the principle of partnership (Hintjens and Hodge 2012: 192; 
Clegg 2013). This paradigm shift was both symbolic in the renaming of ‘Dependent 
Territories’ as ‘Overseas Territories’ and material in a series of new institutional 
arrangements (described below).   
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Thus, while encouraging the drafting of new constitutions in many of the OTs, 
the UK has forged a more assertive role to safeguard its interests. This has meant that 
the OTs remain on the UN list of NSGTs, but it has nevertheless been in both sides’ 
interests for the OTs to maintain a liminal political subjectivity between colonial ward 
and independent statehood. One area of ambiguity is international affairs. The 2012 
White Paper states that ‘The UK Government is responsible for the external relations of 
the Territories but we encourage Territory Governments to play an active role in 
building productive links with the wider world’ (FCO 2012: 79). This devolution of 
powers for external affairs makes sense both as a means of freeing up FCO resources 
during a time of intense budgetary pressure, and as a means of promoting more resilient, 
entrepreneurial economies in the OTs, which can relieve the UK of potential financial 
liabilities. Further, devolving power strengthens the argument that the OTs are self-
governing and therefore not colonies, a charge that has been used by Spain and 
Argentina in their disputes over Gibraltar and the Falklands (respectively). As such, 
whilst the OTs may be deemed illegitimate in the eyes of some within the international 
community, particularly as a result of their remaining on the list of NSGTs, they are 
simultaneously presented by the UK Government, and seek to self-represent, as 
legitimate polities that adhere to core principles of international good governance. OTs 
are thus sites of contestation where legitimacy is in emergence. 
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 Despite these intriguing characteristics, the diplomacy of OTs has attracted 
surprisingly little academic attention, including from scholars who have focused on the 
opportunistic and experimental diplomacy of sub-national governments, known as 
paradiplomacy (see Cornago 2010; Keating 1999). What scholarship there is on OTs 
has predominantly been either detailed case studies of particular OTs or comparative 
analyses. The former includes research on Caribbean offshore financial centres (e.g. 
Hudson 1998), imperial discourses in Gibraltar (Lambert 2005), the role of OTs in 
South Atlantic geopolitics (Dodds 2016) and citizen statecraft in the Falklands 
(Pinkerton and Benwell 2014). Comparative analysis has emerged from political science 
and has focused on issues around constitutional reforms (e.g. Clegg and Gold 2011; 
Clegg and Killingray 2012; Clegg 2013; Hintjens and Hodge 2012) or the attitudes of 
different European states to their overseas territories (e.g. Oostindie and Klinkers 2003). 
Of particular note is Adler-Nissen and Gad’s edited volume on the ‘sovereignty games’ 
played between OTs, their former colonizer states and the EU: games which involve 
contradictory processes of fragmentation and integration. In what follows we both 
extend this work and forge a new approach to examining OTs. Our three vignettes do 
not constitute a comparative study per se, but neither is this an in depth examination of a 
single case. Rather, we bring insights from liminality and assemblage to bear on 
particular sites and events of British OT diplomacy in order foreground hitherto 
overlooked aspects of these distinctive polities: their dynamic, in-between status, the 
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role of material objects and geophysical forces in shaping OT diplomacy and the 
transformations that occur at threshold moments. 
 
London representatives of the OTs 
Perhaps the most obvious place to observe OT diplomacy in action is in the metropole: 
London. The OTs have long had an official presence in London, but it is a presence 
defined by liminality. All but the Pitcairn Islands currently have an official 
representative in the city, and most OTs have offices in imposing buildings with sought-
after London addresses and all the accoutrements of official embassies: brass door 
plaques, flags, glossy photographs of the territories’ flora and fauna, and oak-panelled 
meeting rooms. The representatives are appointed by their OT Government and, as was 
clearly articulated in the interviews, these individuals embody an ambiguous, in-
between political status. On the one hand they are definitively not recognised as 
diplomats under international law and they are not granted the privileges of diplomatic 
immunity under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961). On the other 
hand, the British Government does recognise that they carry out diplomatic functions. 
There is official acknowledgement of their presence in the city, and in particular spaces 
and at particular times they are treated as de facto diplomats. They are, for example, 
invited to attend diplomatic events such as Commonwealth Day events and garden 
parties at Buckingham Palace. Given that they are otherwise on the fringes of the 
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London diplomatic corps, these events provide important networking opportunities and 
a chance to assert the legitimacy not only of their diplomatic role but also of the OT 
Government they represent. The in-between status of the OT representatives is 
exemplified by the London Diplomatic List,2  a document that reinforces Caspersen’s 
(2015) assertion that we should think of ‘degrees of legitimacy.’ The OTs appear as the 
penultimate entries, long after the list of official state embassies and consulates, below 
‘career consuls-general’ (Agents-General for particular provinces of Australia and 
Canada) but above ‘other representative offices and organisations in the United 
Kingdom’, such as the Palestinian Mission to the UK.  
This liminal position in London is also actively cultivated by the diplomats 
themselves, as it enables mobilities that other diplomatic actors do not have. As one 
representative noted, ‘it’s important to leave ambiguities intact… that is to our 
advantage as we can position ourselves with flexibility. We can foster relations with 
members of the diplomatic corps, but also lobby MPs or negotiate with DfID 
[Department for International Development]’ (interview, August 2015). The 
representatives thereby present themselves as existing in multiple states at once: as an 
independent diplomatic actor, as part of the UK, and as politically subordinate to the 
UK. This allows diplomatic creativity and entrepreneurship as, freed from the 
                                                          
2 A list of the representatives of Foreign States and Commonwealth Countries in London published 
monthly by the FCO.  
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constraints that accompany membership of the official diplomatic corps, OT 
representatives are able to experiment with different modes of diplomatic practice (see 
Dickson 2014). 
There is, moreover, a contingency to this liminal subjectivity, and it is only in 
the past decade or so that the London representatives have been able to cultivate this 
advantageous in-between position. As one representative recounted to us, of the hefty 
handover documents he received thirty years ago, most of it [he gestured to the 
thickness of the files] was predominantly a list of things not to do. At that stage the 
most significant objector to the establishment of the London offices of the OTs was the 
FCO itself, which saw them as potential trouble-makers. Those barriers have slowly 
broken down and today the representatives are increasingly recognised and valued for 
their work, including acting as sounding posts for the introduction of new legislation by 
the British Government. Crucial to such a role is having both a physical presence in the 
city and the personal relationships built up between OT and British Government 
representatives. This points both to the contingency of legitimacy and to the material 
dimensions of the diplomatic assemblage. 
The policy changes since the late 1990s have seen a regularisation of the 
relationship between the OTs and the British Government through shifts in the 
apparatuses involved. The ad hoc oversight of the Territories, with responsibilities 
dispersed over different regional desks in the FCO, was replaced by a single, dedicated 
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OTs Department, the appointment of a minister for the Territories and the establishment 
of a new political forum, the Joint Ministerial Council (Clegg 2013). The latter brings 
the OTs’ elected representatives together with central government representatives and 
enables the former to have direct input into decision-making (Hintjens and Hodge 
2012). In short, the spaces and procedures of the FCO were re-coded to produce a more 
coordinated response to the OTs. 
This re-coding of the FCO’s OT apparatus affected, and was affected by, the 
establishment of an umbrella organisation for the OT representatives in London. 
Beginning in 1994 as a forum to bring together the Falkland Islands, Gibraltar and 
Cayman Islands, the UK Overseas Territories Association (UKOTA) has become a key 
space for coordination across the OTs. This includes pooling their limited resources, 
sharing information about British Government policies and presenting a joint voice on 
shared issues of concern, from environmental policy to human rights legislation and tax 
status. Viewing this through the conceptual lens of liminality, UKOTA emerges as an 
enabling site for communitas, an affective experience of equality that emerges through 
experiencing liminality together (Turner 1974). Despite their political differences strong 
bonds are forged between the OTs through this institutionalised setting: in the creation 
of community there is mutual becoming and belonging. Therefore what we see 
beginning in the 1990s is a mutual becoming through which the FCO apparatus and 
those of the OTs centralized their relations, both within and without. 
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Despite these processes of mutual centralisation, there is simultaneous 
fragmentation on both sides. Responsibility for the OTs now extends well beyond the 
FCO, to other government departments as well as local government, private companies 
and NGOs (Clegg 2013). Meanwhile, as our interviews revealed, amongst the OTs there 
remain stark differences. Each OT is governed in its own way and each has a distinct, 
dynamic relationship with the UK. For instance, the Falkland Islands and St Helena 
currently fully support the status quo, while Bermuda and Anguilla are keen to explore 
options for further autonomy. The desire and capability for political autonomy (if not 
independence) is thus unevenly distributed across the OTs, and it is not entirely a 
product of political entrepreneurship. Rather, political autonomy is emergent from the 
intersection of a range of material forces (Protevi 2009), only some of which are human 
and subject to a reflexive intentionality. 
It is the dynamism of these relationships that our approach highlights. In this 
vignette we have shown that the OT representatives have fostered their liminality in 
London, using the mobilities and materialities at their disposal to maximize their 
influence. Assemblage theory also provides a conceptual language for considering the 
mutual becoming of the FCO bureaucracy and the OTs’ relations with one another. 
Whereas the previous literature on the OTs has emphasized the constitutional relations 
between the OTs and the UK, our approach allows us to think about that relationship 
alongside the relationship between the OTs, such as through UKOTA. In the next two 
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sections we examine the unfolding of processes of assemblage in the Falkland Islands 
and in Montserrat, tracing the material constellation of things, bodies, and objects as 
they confront an event – an influx of material energies – and subsequently reach tipping 
points. 
 
Tipping Point 1: 1982 and the Falkland Islands  
In what follows we articulate the narrative of the Falkland Islands as a transition from 
British political dependency to near-autonomy. While this transition was ongoing over a 
long period of time, a rapid shift was sparked by the events of 1982 as the political 
apparatus of the Falklands interacted with other assemblages, such as the UN and the 
Argentinian military apparatus. Here our assemblage approach enables us to highlight 
various events – the 1982 invasion, the 2013 Referendum, the annual meeting of the UN 
Special Committee on Decolonization – as material-energetic transformations that are 
productive of various forms of legitimacy and belonging. In the existing literature on 
the Falklands, these events tend to be considered as coming from distinctly different 
fields of political practice – military practice, democratic practice, and diplomatic 
practice. Assemblage thought allows us to consider all three events as part of the same 
open whole, with each a coming together of bodies, materials, and energies to 
affectively re-code the polity. 
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From the 1830s through World War II, the apparatus governing the Falkland 
Islands was London-based. The Colonial Office appointed the Governor, who in turn 
controlled the Falkland Islands Government, including appointing the legislative 
council. By the late 1940s, however, the Foreign Office and Colonial Office were aware 
that anti-colonial pressure was increasing and the lack of self-government in the 
Falklands Islands could be used against the UK in international forums such as the new 
UN. In response, universal suffrage was introduced in the Falkland Islands Order of 
1948 and the first election of Legislative Council members (four out of twelve were 
directly elected) was held a year later (Dodds 2002).  
 This constitutional system – a hybrid of colonial and democratic regimes – was 
broadly acceptable to the population of the Falklands, but came under pressure as a 
result of the re-territorialization of the UK’s foreign policy apparatus, which culminated 
in 1968. When the Colonial Office and Commonwealth Office were folded into the 
Foreign Office, creating today’s FCO, inward-looking questions of democratic 
accountability and good governance became reframed as outward-looking foreign 
policy matters. Meanwhile the Argentinean claims to the Falkland Islands were framed 
at this time through questions of territorial, rather than popular, sovereignty (see 
Benwell and Dodds 2011; Keeling 2013). The FCO itself hoped that the Islanders might 
become more open to Argentina with time, eventually enabling a resolution to the 
dispute.  Yet during this period the Falkland Islanders increasingly portrayed 
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themselves as a ‘loyal colony’ (Dodds 2002: 131) to British audiences, in hopes of 
forestalling a deal by the FCO with the Argentineans on Falklands sovereignty.  
 The 1982 invasion marked a tipping point in the Falklands apparatus. First, the 
war cemented the relationship between British nationalism and the UK’s small territory 
in the South Atlantic. It was no longer necessary for the Islanders to argue for their 
Britishness: it was taken-for-granted, sealed in the blood of the British military. As 
Dodds notes, ‘Thatcher [argued] that the formal sovereignty of the Falklands was non-
negotiable… [and] the 1982 British Nationality (Falkland Islands) Amendment Act was 
passed to enable all Falkland Islanders to become British citizens’ (2002: 185). Second, 
a new constitution was promulgated in 1985, emphasizing self-government. In stating 
that all Falkland Islands Government Councillors would be directly elected the new 
constitution effectively reduced the political role of the London-appointed Governor 
(ibid).  By sealing the political link between the UK and the Falklands, the invasion thus 
paradoxically re-shaped the Falklands into a more autonomous polity. Of course, 
manifesting this new postcolonial governmental apparatus in the realm of diplomacy 
requires the re-organizing of materials and bodies in space so as to render this new form 
visible.  In this case, we examine two sites in which the new postcolonial Falkland 
Islands were materialised: the 2013 Referendum and the UN Special Committee on 
Decolonization.  
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The Falkland Islands Government announced the referendum in June 2012, at 
the peak of the international commemoration of the 30th anniversary of the Falklands 
Islands War. Held in March 2013, the referendum should be understood as an event, a 
coming together of bodies, technologies, and spaces that enable an object – the result – 
to emerge in the political field and exert its agency (Page and Dittmer 2015). That this is 
a profoundly material event is clear from the account of the referendum given by Dodds 
and Pinkerton (2013).  At its most basic level, the referendum relied on ballots, brought 
into relation with individual voters, such that they become marked with what is assumed 
to be voters’ preferences. These ballots are then aggregated into a table to calculate 
something that might be understood via liberal political philosophy as ‘the will of the 
people’. Notably, this event is therefore also (re)constitutive of this emergent category: 
‘the people’. This is crucial as the UK’s claim to sovereignty over the islands is based 
on the self-determination of the islanders, whereas Argentina’s claim is territorial in 
nature. Maximizing the voter turnout (which is understood as increasing a referendum’s 
legitimacy) entailed the operation of four polling stations, a series of mobile teams to 
canvass the islands, and even an airplane-based polling station to serve the outer islands 
(ibid.). Beyond the bodies of the voters themselves, another set of bodies crucial to the 
referendum’s significance were those of the international observers. Their importance is 
clear from the efforts undertaken by the Argentinian Government to thwart international 
participation. In the end, the Canadian Government funded the observation team, and 
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the observers certified the referendum result (99.8% in favour of remaining an Overseas 
Territory) before the assembled global media. The international recognition of the 
referendum was a key performative dimension of the event’s unfolding: the Falkland 
Islanders are a ‘people’, exercising their self-determination and acting in practice with 
relative autonomy.  
 Another site at which this relative autonomy is proffered to a global audience on 
an annual basis is the UN Special Committee on Decolonization. The Falkland Islands 
are a regular feature of this annual diplomatic event, as a 1965 General Assembly 
resolution called for peaceful resolution of the situation via negotiation. As the Special 
Committee is obliged to report on the progress towards this goal its meetings are 
flashpoints for contestation over the liminal nature of the Falkland Islands polity: is it a 
colonial dependency, or a near-autonomous polity?  
 The UK Representative of the Falkland Islands described to us how the task of 
representation has (informally) changed in recent years: 
The lines of demarcation between the Overseas Territories and the FCO used to 
be quite rigid regarding representation overseas. This changed about five years 
ago for the Falklands. The UK Government thought it would be expedient for 
the Falkland Islanders to argue their own case. So the FCO launched a public 
diplomacy programme, including training and secondments…. Now Falkland 
Islands Assembly members tour Latin America, Canada, the United States, 
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etcetera, representing the interests of the Islands… and appearing at the C24 
[Special Committee] (Interview, 2015) 
As a highly routinized diplomatic site, the Special Committee is produced via the usual 
trappings of diplomacy and is a site where competing sources of legitimacy are 
articulated and embodied. The variable from year to year is found in the bodies 
dispatched to diplomatically represent the polities. For the Falkland Islands, these are 
two members of the Legislative Assembly, who generally speak about the relative 
development of the Islands and the will of Islanders to engage in self-determination. For 
instance, at the 2013 meeting, Sharon Halford of the Legislative Assembly highlighted 
the outcome of the referendum, and stressed that the Falkland Islands was hardly a 
British settler colony, but instead home to people of 57 different nationalities (in a 
population of roughly 2,500).  Assembly member Michael Summers followed Halford 
by arguing that the Special Committee had no mandate to resolve sovereignty disputes 
and should instead uphold the Islanders’ right to self-determination (Special Committee 
13 June 2013). Together these diplomats personally embodied – via their roles as 
democratically elected members of the Government – an understanding of the Falkland 
Islands polity that is rooted in good governance, self-determination, and community: 
qualities that are proffered to legitimate the liminal polity in the eyes of international 
law. Notable by their absence in these meetings is any representative of the UK; having 
FCO bodies in the room would have undercut the claim of the Islanders to self-
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representation and self-determination, and compromised the claim of them to be 
legitimate representatives of the Islanders. 
 Argentina also dispatches representatives to the annual meeting and, through the 
biographies of these individuals seeks to legitimise its own claim to the islands. First 
among the representatives is usually the Foreign Minister (unless the President 
addresses the committee, as in 2012), who articulates a narrative of British colonial 
intransigence. In the 2013 meeting the Foreign Minister interpreted the aforementioned 
lack of British representation in the meeting as imperial hubris (Special Committee 20 
June 2013). In 2015 Argentina had two Falkland Islanders speak on their behalf: 
Guillermo Clifton, a second-generation Islander who critiqued British oil exploration in 
the area and its environmental consequences, and Picardo Patterson, who complained of 
British intransigence in the face of Argentine generosity. These ‘diplomats’ and the 
narratives that they embody work to produce a set of claims on the territory of the 
Falklands; the bodies of the state (foreign minister, president) set the scene for the 
narratives of territorial loss offered up by the private petitioners: of homes lost, of ways 
of life destroyed, of British stonewalling in the face of near-global approbation. Here 
the ‘decolonization’ called for is not the ‘postcolonial’ Government found in Stanley, 
but the teleological eradication of colonialism originally envisioned in the UN after 
World War II. 
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 History shows that the 1982 invasion by Argentina accelerated the Falkland 
Islands’ movement from one materialized formation into another, gaining the trappings 
of an independent polity without realizing that actual state. Nevertheless, it remains 
unable to satisfy its critics despite moving as far as possible in its current configuration. 
Were this OT to move any further towards autonomy it would have to become 
independent, and yet this would appear to be impossible because the Islands’ autonomy 
is predicated on continued British military and diplomatic protection. Assemblage 
thinking allows us to understand this political liminality as a particular equilibrium of 
material flows; while there may be many other potential equilibria, it is unclear how the 
polity can move from one state to the other in the current context.  
 
Tipping Point 2: 1997 and Montserrat 
In this final example we turn to Montserrat, an OT that, in contrast to the Falklands 
experience, has tipped from a state of self-sufficiency into a form of colonial 
dependency. If in the last vignette our approach enabled us to consider ‘legitimacy’ as 
an emergent property of the Falklands assemblage, this vignette allows us to understand 
the ‘viability’ of a polity like Montserrat in similar terms, with material-energetic events 
both pushing the polity towards particular equilibria and re-shaping the political 
subjectivities of policy-makers and citizens. In this case, due to volcanic eruptions, the 
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foreseeable future in Montserrat is sustained by significant flows of aid money from the 
UK budget, which codes the polity as ‘unviable’.  
Montserrat became a British dependency in 1632. Its history as an island of 
white-owned plantations dependent on imported slave labour meant that Montserrat 
originally had a (white) representative democracy; however the end of the slave trade 
brought closer oversight from London with Crown Colony status in the late 1800s 
(Skelton 2000). While this can be read as UK intervention to end slavery on the island, 
it can equally be read as the maintenance of white rule over a majority black population 
in a post-slavery context. Indeed, race also arguably underpinned differences between 
how post-1945 debates about the future of the OTs played out in Montserrat versus the 
white settler Falkland Islands. 
Along with this racial coding came a range of material differentiations, from the 
mobility of various bodies (e.g., the possibility of migration to the UK) to the attribution 
of material ‘viability’ or ‘unviability’ to various territories with regard to independence. 
The latter – a paternalist discourse of sovereignty – seeks to define the minimum ‘size’ 
necessary for a polity to survive on its own, whether that size be territorial, economic, 
or demographic (on resilience, see Grove 2013). Of course, as we shall see the ‘size’ 
necessary also depends on the hypothesized shock that a polity must be able to endure 
without assistance. One early solution to the problem of the ‘unviable’ Caribbean island 
territories was to aggregate them into a more viable formation: the Federation of the 
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West Indies (Taylor 2000). This Federation lasted only four years (1958-1962) before 
dissolution because of questions over the degree to which flows – of money, migrant 
bodies, and goods – ought to be enabled within the Federation (it lacked a customs 
union, for instance). In the wake of this deterritorialization, Montserrat opted in 1961 to 
remain a dependency of the UK, albeit one with increasing political autonomy and 
economic success (British budgetary aid ended in 1981 – see Clay et al., 1999). This 
economic success contributed to a sense of Montserrat as ‘viable’ and self-sustaining, as 
long as flows of tourists and agricultural exports continued. 
However, the dynamism of the earth and its systems has worked to undercut the 
perceived viability of Montserrat. Indeed, it is impossible to explain the current 
relationship between Montserrat and the British Government without taking into 
account the agency of the earth (Barry 2013; Yusoff 2013; Squire 2016). The initial 
blow to viability came from the air: ‘When Hurricane Hugo struck in late 1989, 
commitment to remaining a colony of Britain was strengthened as people saw the UK 
Government pour so much support and financial aid into the island and Montserratians 
worked alongside Royal Navy officers who came to help with the clean-up and 
rebuilding’ (Skelton 2000: 108). The intense flows of capital, bodies, and support 
provided an affective context in which the bonds of colonialism could feel welcome. 
Still, by 1995 things had largely returned to pre-hurricane levels and the economy was 
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in surplus. This was a positive affirmation of Montserrat’s viability and resilience, albeit 
one dependent on latent colonial bonds that could be activated in times of need.  
The second blow to viability came from the earth itself. On 25 June 1997 the 
Soufriere Hills volcano erupted, killing 19 people and burying Plymouth, the capital and 
only major settlement on the island, in ash. As a British Government commissioned 
report noted afterwards, ‘With half the island in an exclusion zone… the continuing 
viability of the island for human habitation was in doubt… [with] the only settlement 
possibilities being confined to the northern third of the island’ (Clay et al., 1999: 16). 
This event triggered the suspension of existing social and political structures both 
within the island, and between Montserrat and the UK. This already liminal polity 
entered into a heightened liminal phase. The eruption also unleashed a series of migrant 
flows, with roughly 90% of the pre-volcano population having to relocate at least once, 
and nearly two-thirds of the population fleeing the island entirely (ibid.). The seemingly 
permanent state of anxiety that afflicts the remaining islanders is the result of the 
scientific uncertainty surrounding the geology of the island’s south (will the volcano 
blow again? When?). This affect of anxiety has been generative of creative economic 
activities in Montserrat, crystalizing around (for instance) new models of disaster 
tourism, but nothing that replaces the 20% of the GDP lost by the decline of traditional 
tourism (Gaudru 2014).  
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 The volcanic eruption was thus not only a geophysical event but also a political 
one. It literally reshaped the ground on which the Montserratians stood, and equally it 
reshaped Whitehall subjectivities: ‘The main town, Plymouth, was buried in ash and 
lava, highlighting the UK government’s contingent liability in a particularly visible 
way. With Montserrat, a “little known pink bit” [of the map] suddenly became highly 
visible, perhaps for the first time since the Falklands War’ (Hintjens and Hodge 2012: 
199). This ‘contingent liability’ primarily took the form of financial and material 
support; since 1997 DfID has provided £324 million in aid to Montserrat, or roughly 
half of the aid provided to all OTs. 
Nevertheless, the response of the UK Government to the volcano received 
mixed reviews, as the political responsibilities were problematically divided between 
Her Majesty’s Government and the Government of Montserrat, and between the FCO 
and DfID. As a former governor of Montserrat later wrote, 
It seems to me that there was a case for the assumption of direct rule [by the 
Crown’s Governor] – it is hard to imagine a more appropriate situation – but 
that, given Montserrat’s 40 years of near independence it would not have been 
supported by the British Government, even where it might have produced more 
efficient decision making and perhaps saved lives. (Taylor 2000, 341, emphasis 
added) 
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The paradox here – of a colonial power reluctant to wield executive power, and of a 
colony reiterating its continued dependence – indicates how much the agency of the 
volcano has materially reshaped the processes by which political subjectivities were 
emergent in the Eastern Caribbean. In short, the ‘viability’ of Montserrat had been 
decimated, and the subsequent relations between the UK and Montserrat would come to 
be defined by long-term dependency.  
 Given DfID’s role in funding the infrastructure that is meant to produce ‘self-
sufficiency’, it is not surprising that it maintains a paternal relationship with the 
Government of Montserrat. This diplomatic activity includes UK-based DfID staff 
visiting the island ‘to negotiate Montserrat’s budget and determine its progress towards 
meeting agreed goals,’ (ICAI 2013: 3) and a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
signed between the DfID and the Government of Montserrat in 2012 whereby, in order 
to gain a tranche of development funds for a new capital (Little Bay) and port (Carr’s 
Bay) as well as improved land/sea access, the Government of Montserrat had to accept a 
swathe of investment, immigration and tax reforms (Memorandum 2012). Notably, 
these reforms undercut Montserratian autonomy by unleashing flows of money, migrant 
bodies, and goods: the very same flows that tore the Federation of the West Indies apart 
in 1962. This time, however, the politics of postcoloniality have been eclipsed by the 
politics of coloniality, with Montserrat reaching a tipping point between equilibria of 
viability and unviability. While DfID’s role in auditing the books indicates both the 
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political cost of dependency for Montserrat, and the on-going focus by both sides on the 
production of viability, the MoU and increased control from London recalls nothing so 
much as the Crown Colony period of the late-nineteenth century. 
A range of post-1997 material flows – pyroclastic, capital, and migrant – have 
thus rendered Montserrat subordinate to DfID, and that geologic agency has reshaped 
the political subjectivities of all involved. Montserrat, once a model of Caribbean 
development whose leaders aspired to autonomy and perhaps independence, has been 
opened up to external intervention. The material existence of the MoU and its 
circulation between civil servants in Montserrat and London renders tangible the 
differentiation of particular spaces and the production of hierarchy within them over 
time. Moreover, whereas political ecology approaches have emphasized the roots of 
purportedly ‘natural’ disasters in human politics and economics, an assemblage 
approach highlights the ability of both human and non-human forces to affect policy-
makers’ sensibilities and subjectivities around risk, resilience, and vulnerability.  
While this account has emphasized the increasing subjection of the 
Montserratian people to the power of the volcano, and subsequently to DfID, it is 
nevertheless worth noting that Montserrat – like the Falkland Islands – has to go before 
the UN Decolonization Committee. In 2012 then-Premier Meade asked for Montserrat 
to be removed from the list of NSGTs, arguing – again, like the Falkland Islands – that 
the people of Montserrat had chosen this political subjectivity (Clegg 2013). While it is 
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increasingly difficult to argue that Montserrat has any real choices in its current 
‘unviability’, the ability to portray oneself (or be portrayed) in multiple states – as self-
governing, or as a dependency – to different audiences is key to inhabiting a liminal 
subjectivity.  While the trajectory of Montserrat has gone from Crown Colony to proto-
independence and back again, it is clear that its liminality is both something its leaders 
can direct to its advantage with different audiences, but also a status shaped by the 
actions of the Lesser Antilles Volcanic Arc, as well as centuries of imperial political-
economy. An assemblage-oriented geopolitics must account for all these human and 
non-human forces, and understand how they render the ground on which politics rests – 
and therefore the subjectivities and sensibilities of policy-makers – unstable. 
  
Conclusion 
In this paper we have brought together conceptual frameworks developed in fields not 
usually associated with diplomacy – cultural anthropology, cultural geography and 
science and technology studies (STS) – into dialogue with the increasingly diversified 
and dynamic diplomatic landscape. Specifically we have highlighted productive and as 
yet unexplored intersections between anthropological literature on liminality and the 
STS-inflected literature on assemblage, with its focus on materiality, tipping points and 
the processual nature of international life.  We suggest that this intersection can offer a 
new and innovative approach to the study of diplomacy. Augmenting work in critical 
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diplomacy studies that promotes a relational approach, the framing that we outline here 
brings to the fore the creative and entrepreneurial aspects of diplomatic practice, shifts 
attention to the role of materiality and non-human agency in diplomacy, highlights the 
insights that can be gained from shifting our attention to the perspective of liminal 
polities, and offers a novel perspective on questions of legitimacy in the field of 
diplomacy.  
In working through the intersections between liminality and assemblage we have 
turned attention to the oft-overlooked diplomatic articulations of the British Overseas 
Territories. We have suggested that, existing somewhere between independent states 
and colonial dependencies, these are inherently liminal state-like assemblages that can 
take on several distinct formations. In other words they can present themselves (or be 
presented) as existing in multiple states at once (e.g., as either politically subordinate to 
the UK or as an independent diplomatic actor). The capacity to deploy material 
resources (e.g., diplomats, ballots, development aid) in ways that are productive of 
multiple political subjectivities enables the potential for creativity and the sense of 
unsettled-ness that the literature on liminality conveys, but does not explain. We have 
sought to do precisely this through three our vignettes.  
  Liminality and assemblage have thus together helped us to conceptualize a 
particular set of diplomatic relationships over time, but we suggest that our theoretical 
fusion can also inform a wider range of studies. For instance, STS is both where 
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assemblage theory emerged and also a field that has problematized the relationship 
between micro-scaled practices (in this case OT diplomacy) and macro-scaled 
phenomena (such as the state, or the diplomatic system). However, the focus in STS has 
tended to be on specific technologies and the scientific knowledges that surround them. 
Here we have focused on diplomatic events in the OTs that demonstrate liminality, and 
sought to trace the materialities that shaped those events. This thus has the potential to 
extend the empirical gaze of STS scholarship and also put STS scholars into dialogue 
with the concept of liminality. Similarly, for anthropologists, bringing liminality into 
dialogue with assemblage foregrounds questions of materiality, tipping points and affect 
and has the potential both to reinvigorate work on liminality and forge connections with 
work in STS and human geography. 
 In political geography our conceptualisation provides a language for empirically 
tracing the event, in which various assemblages shift from one formation to another. 
Given the (relatively) flat ontology of assemblage theory, this liminal status can be 
experienced by assemblages ‘small’ (e.g., an OT representative in London) or ‘large’ 
(e.g., Iraqi ‘sovereignty’ taken away in 2003 and ceremonially restored in 2004). 
Indeed, liminality –as the inverse of resilience– may be understood as a characteristic of 
any assemblage that has the potential for rapid transformation, a characteristic that is of 
course dependent on the magnitude of the force that might be unleashed upon it in any 
given time. Following from our case studies, the autonomy of any polity – whether 
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‘unviable’ like Montserrat or paternalist like the UK – is contingent on a range of 
geophysical, climatic and other forces as well as the traditional military, political, and 
economic concerns. Therefore, it is incumbent on scholars to focus on the events that 
are constantly re-making our world in ways both large and small. 
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